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The Exceptional Nature of Terrorism:
the United States and Middle Eastern
Legal Systemst
By WADIE E. SAID*
The focus of this article is on the perception of the legal systems
of the Arab Middle East from the perspective of the United States, in
keeping with the theme of the panel, which asked how the so-called
"West" sees the "Rest." Where such a theme, however provocative,
is clearly too broad for any type of comprehensive analysis, this
article's more directed inquiry attempts to partially answer the
question of how the West sees the Rest in a specific context, which
hopefully enriches the discussion generated by the conference. The
choice of the United States is merited as its involvement and various
entanglements in the Middle East far outstrip those of any other
country or international organization. While United States influence
is not limited to that of the Arab countries of the Middle East, the
advantage to singling out the Arab world lies in the region's
perceived status as the home of modem political violence of both
the secular and Islamist bent.
By way of prefatory caveat, the Middle East provides an
extreme example of the inability to divorce the legal from the
political. In a region where repressive regimes and non-state actors
frequently clash in a contest over whose narrow interest controls the
fractious nation-state, establishing functioning independent and
empowered legal systems has proved challenging. It should come
t Remarks from The West and the Rest in Comparative Law, 2008 Annual
Meeting of the American Society of Comparative Law, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law (Oct. 2-4, 2008).
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. The author
wishes to thank the organizers of the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Society
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as no surprise, therefore, that Western perceptions of Middle
Eastern legal systems and the quality of rights they provide to their
citizenry are negative and highly critical. However, with respect to
the United States, there is a general exception to this rule in that the
above critical posture will give way to political expediency,
primarily in the context of fighting terrorism. In other words,
Middle Eastern legal systems and institutions, such as they exist, as
well as certain practices, will be criticized and scrutinized, unless
there is some ostensible overriding reason for refraining from such
criticism, usually based in strategic interests - in this case, terrorism.
The practice of criticizing countries in the Middle East for
mistreating their own citizens except where such mistreatment
aligns with United States interests is a cynical exercise in large part,
since it rests on a double standard. While some might argue that
there is no double standard, in keeping with the late Jeanne
Kirkpatrick's attempt during the Cold War to distinguish between
pro-American "authoritarian" regimes and pro-Soviet "totalitarian"
regimes, such logic is unavailing.1 It is, however, hardly unique, as
powerful nations like the United States frequently take what they
perceive to be the most beneficial course of action, regardless of
whether there is the appearance of a double standard.
In the case of the Arab Middle East, condoning extreme tactics
in the name of fighting terrorism hinders any serious effort to
discuss legal reform in the region on account of the two-fold
message. First, the implication is that the Middle East is a region
devoid of the rule of law (in the most positive sense of the term),
since due process and human rights protections are nonexistent in
practice. While the point should not be read as an attempt to argue
that the woeful state of human rights protections in the Middle East
is due solely or primarily to foreign manipulation or interference,
when the United States sends the message - whether in word or
deed - that a particular country or region is incapable of a true
change in its human rights policy, there can be no real change in
that policy. If a state of affairs is perceived as immutable, after a
while even illegal practices lose their novelty and risk becoming
1. See, e.g., Juan E. M~ndez & Javier Mariezcurrena, Prospects for Human Rights
Advocacy in the Wake of September 11, 2001, 22 LAW & INEQ. 223, 229-30 (2004)
(criticizing the theory on the basis that the distinction between potentially
redeemable "authoritarian" regimes and irredeemable "totalitarian" ones was
made entirely on the basis of whether the regime in question was pro-American. If
so, it was considered authoritarian; if not, totalitarian).
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accepted or tolerated in their status as commonplace and inevitable.
Second, any attempt to engage in genuine legal reform is
effectively scuttled or dismissed out of hand, since the United
States' role in pushing for such reform is perceived as hypocritical
and/or insincere.2 For example, when a government engaged in
repressive measures against its own population is criticized by the
United States, it can (and almost always does) point out that the
United States has no business interfering in its internal affairs. 3 In
addition, even serious American efforts to generate legal or human
rights reform can be abandoned to political expediency, given the
importance of certain regimes - whether they are U.S. allies or not -
to U.S. interests.4 The ultimate conclusion is that the United States,
the most powerful actor on the world stage, is either incapable of or
unwilling to effect real legal change in the Middle East, most
prominently on the issue of human rights.
I. Official Statements on Middle Eastern Legal Systems
There are several official United States government sources
and/or policies that express disdain and generally condemn the
overall human rights records of Middle Eastern countries. The
archetype and primary vehicle for expressing this critical attitude
comes in the form of the State Department's annual country reports
on human rights, which are the most thorough, comprehensive, and
systematic of their kind issued by a national government; they are
also more extensive than anything issued by the United Nations or
European Union. In the case of Arab Middle Eastern nations, the
reports are replete with trenchant criticisms of the lack of
established freedoms and the legal institutions to protect human
rights. The overall negative and critical tenor of the reports is not
affected in great part by a country's status as an ally or antagonist of
the United States.5 That said, it is important to note that human
2. Michael Slackman, On Human Rights, US Seems to Give Egypt a Pass, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2007.
3. Id.
4. Id (Egypt, an American ally); Thanassis Cambanis,Challenged, Syria Extends
Crackdown on Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007.
5. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTIcES - 2008, EGYPT, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2008/nea/119114.htm; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACrICES - JORDAN, available at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119118.htm; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
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rights considerations are but one factor that inform United States
foreign policy with respect to a given country or region. Since they
do not have the force of law or constitute an authoritative statement
of policy, the human rights reports, however thorough or far-
ranging, do not necessarily portend adverse consequences for falling
below any type of legally mandated human rights threshold.
In contrast, with respect to binding judicial opinions, the
Supreme Court, in the rare instance where it even touches on
Middle Eastern legal systems, has done so in only highly tangential
terms. Perhaps the most apt example of this phenomenon is the
Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons, a 2005 opinion declaring the
death penalty unconstitutional as applied to minors.6 One of the
points stressed in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion related to the
prevalence of the practice of executing minors in the community of
nations. Since 1990, only a few countries, among them Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, and Iran, had executed minors, and even those
countries have since repudiated the practice. 7 The opinion leaves
the reader with the perhaps unintentional impression that it was
unseemly for the United States to be in such company, thereby
buttressing the conclusion that the practice was unconstitutional.
To the extent that Middle Eastern legal systems were being
discussed at the Supreme Court, they were discussed in only the
most indirect and brief manner. In the academic literature, the
opinion is far more noteworthy for its citation to foreign law and the
ensuing debate on the advisability of that practice,8 coming as it did
despite Justice Scalia's unequivocal rejection of the position that
foreign decisions or rulings should play a part in influencing how
the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution.9
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - SAUDI ARABIA, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119126.htm; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACrIcES - SYRIA,
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119127.htm; UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTIcES -
LEBANON, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2O08/nea/
119120.htm; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES - SUDAN, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2008/af/119026.htm.
6. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
7. Id. at 577.
8. See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison, 56
AM. J. Comp. L. 947 (2008).
9. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 621-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("More
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While examples of federal court decisions rendering opinions
on Middle Eastern legal systems are not commonplace, examples do
exist. Consider the case of Sameh Khouzam, an Egyptian Coptic
Christian who was detained immediately upon arrival in the United
States on suspicion of having committed a murder in his native
country.10 Although two different federal appeals courts referred to
the "serious reasons" to believe Khouzam had committed a murder,
and despite a finding that his political asylum and withholding of
removal claims were not established by credible evidence, his
deportation to Egypt was deferred indefinitely on the basis that he
would be subjected to torture at the hands of the Egyptian police
were he to be returned there in violation of the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Degrading, or
Inhuman Treatment or Punishment.11 After receiving diplomatic
assurances from Egypt that he would not be tortured upon his
return, the government tried again to deport Khouzam, but has seen
its latest efforts stymied on the basis that he has been denied due
process.12
Specifically, the Second Circuit credited evidence that "the
Egyptian police have routinely tortured, abused, and killed
suspected criminals to extract confessions," a conclusion that was
fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the Court's argument-that American
law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out of
hand.").
10. Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 549 F.3d 235 (3rd Cir. 2008)
[hereinafter Khouzam I].
11. See id.; see also Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 166, 169-71 (2d Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter Khouzam II].
12. Khouzam I, 549 F.3d at 259. (The Third Circuit remanded the matter to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) "in order to ensure that Khouzam is afforded
due process before he may be removed on the basis of diplomatic assurances," and
that due process in this context entails "opportunity to present, before a neutral and
impartial decision maker, evidence and arguments challenging the reliability of
diplomatic assurances proffered by the Government, and the Government's
compliance with the relevant regulations," as well as "an individualized
determination of the matter based on a record disclosed to the alien."). While the
Khouzam cases leave open the possibility that he might be deported on the basis of
diplomatic assurances that he will not be tortured, the European Court of Human
Rights has recently disallowed deportation in similar circumstances. See Saadi v.
Italy (App. No.37201/06), judgment of Feb. 28, 2008 (Eur. Ct. of Hum. Rts.) (holding
that deportation of suspected terrorist to his home country of Tunisia would violate
Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms' nonderogable ban on subjecting individuals to torture or
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment).
2009]
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corroborated by the State Department's human rights report on
Egypt.1 3 Taken at face value, the Khouzam decisions constitute a
clear statement by federal appeals courts of the United States that
torture is rampant in Egyptian law enforcement. While the State
Department's human rights reports say exactly the same thing, what
makes this particular finding remarkable is that it has so far
prevented the deportation of a murder suspect from the United
States to one of its major allies and the second-largest recipient of
annual foreign aid. Despite the very close political ties between the
United States and Egypt, such relations will not prevent a federal
court from officially recording its very negative opinion of a
significant component of the legal system of a Middle Eastern
nation, regardless of whether it is a close ally.
A final example of an official policy that through its very
existence criticizes the legal system, or lack thereof, of a foreign
country is that of political asylum. In broad legal terms, asylum is
awarded to those who are "unable or unwilling to return to [their]
home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion." 14 Recent legislative
developments, explicitly geared at asylum applications by terrorists
and/or based on fraudulent claims, have had the effect of rendering
it much harder for individuals to receive asylum in the United
States.15 While the existence of political asylum as a policy and a
practice has the noble goal of providing those seeking relief with a
place of refuge from oppression, it also signals that the country
under scrutiny is lacking in its respect for the rule of law, and
therefore somehow lesser in the pantheon of nations.16 Grants of
asylum carry the same message, whether in the Middle Eastern
context or otherwise, and in general terms reinforce the dismal
picture of legal systems and human rights protections in the Middle
East.
13. Khouzam II, 361 F.3d at 169, 171.
14. I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (quoting the Immigration
and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).
15. David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV.
1359, 1385-92 (2007) (also noting federal appellate court criticism of the haphazard
and arbitrary manner in which asylum applications are adjudicated in immigration
courts).
16. Id. at 1385-86.
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II. Contradictions and Complications
Taken as a whole, the above examples, however brief, serve as
evidence of the first message such a critical posture represents - that
the Middle East is a legal backwater where no protections for rights
or due process exist. As this paper is not intended as an apologia
for any of the regimes of the Middle East and their legal systems,
there is strong evidence to substantiate the harsh criticisms of how
the law functions - or rather, does not function - in the Middle East
when one discusses human rights and the rule of law. Of course,
this generally negative picture is not unique to the Middle East as a
region, and there are many areas of the world that suffer from
similarly defective legal regimes. The phenomenon dubbed
"terrorism," which is understood to be shorthand for Islamic
terrorism is, however accurately or inaccurately, identified with the
region, and is employed as a justification for those tactics and
methods that have been previously criticized. Put differently, when
a state engages in, e.g., torture, the tone and nature of U.S. criticism
of the practice will depend in large part on whether such torture is
being used against individuals deemed terrorists.
Perhaps there is no tactic more exemplary of the exceptional
nature of terrorism than the practice of extraordinary rendition,
which involves sending a non-citizen to another country so as to
face more coercive interrogation techniques, i.e., torture, than can be
found in the United States.17 The practice as now understood
developed in the 1990s, as a tactic to thwart suspected terrorists
from taking violent action in situations where their activities did not
give rise to criminal prosecution in the United States. 18 The first
instance of the United States engaging in the practice involved
Talaat Fouad Qassem, an Egyptian national and spokesman for Al-
Gama'a Al-Islamiyya, who was reportedly apprehended in 1995 by
the CIA in Croatia, and subsequently turned over to the Egyptian
authorities.19 He was presumed executed.
17. See, e.g., Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary
Renditions and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1336 ("For the purpose of
this Article, 'extraordinary rendition' is defined as the transfer of an individual,
without the benefit of a legal proceeding in which the individual can challenge the
transfer, to a country where he or she is at risk of torture.").
18. See American Civil Liberties Union "Fact Sheet: Extraordinary Rendition,"
(2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/extraordinaryrendition/22203
res20051206.html (last visited April 14, 2009).
19. Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Story of El-Masri v. Tenet, in HUMAN RIGHTS
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The practice of extraordinary rendition expanded in frequency
and scope after September 11, 2001, which in turn exacerbated the
potential for abuse or mistake in the process. Perhaps the two most
paradigmatic cases in the context of rendition concern Maher Arar, a
Canadian citizen of Syrian descent, and Khaled El-Masri, a German
citizen of Lebanese origin. Arar was detained in the United States in
September 2002, while en route from a family vacation in Tunisia to
his home in Montreal, and, after a period of detention of around two
weeks, sent to Syria, where he was jailed for a year and tortured on
the mistaken basis that he was an al-Qaeda member. 20 Despite
being completely exonerated and awarded significant compensation
for his suffering by the Canadian government, Arar has been
unsuccessful in obtaining relief in the United States.21
El-Masri was detained while on vacation in early 2004 by
Macedonian authorities for approximately 23 days, and then sent to
what he claims was a secret CIA prison in Afghanistan, where he
alleges he was tortured. After spending months in incommunicado
detention and being subjected to torture, American authorities
apparently recognized their error, and returned him in the middle
of the night to a deserted road somewhere in Albania.22 Like Arar,
El-Masri's post-release attempts to obtain relief through a lawsuit
for damages against the American authorities have not borne fruit,
albeit for different reasons. In particular, the government was
successful in its attempt to argue that El-Masri's lawsuit was barred
by the state secrets privilege, which would, it contended, forbid any
inquiry into the existence and operation of the extraordinary
rendition program.23 This use of the state secrets privilege is
seemingly set to continue despite the presence of a new
administration in Washington. Recently, the Department of Justice
has indicated that it will continue to invoke the state secrets
privilege as a bar to lawsuits alleging abuses that resulted from an
extraordinary rendition.24
ADVOCACY STORIES 541-2 (Deena R. Hurwitz, Margaret L. Satterthwaite, and Doug
Ford, eds. 2008); ANTHONY SHADID, LEGACY OF THE PROPHET: DESPOTS, DEMOCRATS,
AND THE NEW POLITICS OF ISLAM 105 (2002).
20. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2nd Cir. 2008).
21. Id.
22. Satterthwaite, supra note 19, at 535-37, 542-43, 549-50.
23. E1-Masri v. U.S., 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373
(2007).
24. John Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009.
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The main post-9/11 difference in the rendition scheme is that
the practice now includes the element of the United States as
renditionee; Khaled El-Masri serves as the highest profile victim of a
rendition to U.S. custody, albeit in a detention center on foreign soil.
Contrast this situation with Europe, where the European Court for
Human Rights recently held that suspected terrorists cannot be
deported to countries where they might be tortured or killed, even
where the deporting state obtains diplomatic assurances from the
country of origin that such treatment will not occur.25 Where many
European states have condemned the practice, Italy has gone so far
as to try criminally both the Italian intelligence and CIA agents for
the rendition of a cleric to Egypt.26
The tactic of rendition looks set to survive the change of
administrations. Newly appointed CIA Director Leon Panetta
testified at his congressional confirmation hearing that the agency
will continue to engage in the practice of renditions, although he
stated that individuals would not be sent to countries with a
reputation for torture or actions "that violate our human values." 27
Regardless of the accuracy of this statement, the existence of a
program of extraordinary rendition serves to reinforce the message
that the countries of the Middle East, e.g., Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
Morocco, etc., are legal backwaters where coercive interrogation and
torture can happen. More pointedly, the indication is that torture
needs to happen to effectively thwart terrorism, particularly that of
an Islamic and/or Arab bent, notwithstanding the implication of
such a policy for the rights and freedoms of citizens in the Middle
East and elsewhere.
A further example of the exceptional nature of terrorism
involves the successful attempt by the United States government to
introduce, in a criminal trial, the confession made abroad to Saudi
security agents by an American citizen suspected of membership in
an al-Qaeda cell. Ordinarily, it is axiomatic that evidence gleaned
by coercion will not be admitted in a criminal trial. In United States
v. Abu Ali, the government was allowed to introduce the statements
25. Saadi v. Italy, supra note 12.
26. Rachel Donadio, Italian Court Upends Trial Involving C.I.A. Links, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2009; Elizabeth Rosenthal, Italian Trial of CIA Operatives Begins with Torture
Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2008.
27. Mark Mazzetti, Panetta Open to Tougher Methods in Some C.I.A. Interrogations,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 2009.
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made by the defendant while in Saudi custody, even though he was
held incommunicado without charge for over a year, and was even
threatened with being made an enemy combatant by FBI agents
who were allowed to interrogate him.28 Abu Ali's confession was
admitted despite the State Department's annual human rights report
finding the existence of widespread torture practiced by the very
same Saudi agency detaining him.29 Abu Ali was in a difficult
position to challenge the Saudi officers who testified at his trial,
since they were permitted to do so via two-way videolink from
Saudi Arabia under pseudonyms, thereby rendering any possibility
of perjury sanctions remote at best.30 Ultimately, while the United
States government had acknowledged that Saudi Arabia has a
longstanding history of torturing detainees, the subtext of the Abu
Ali prosecution seems to be that in this case, involving a suspected
al-Qaeda terrorist, it did not.
A final example of how the United States views terrorism as an
extraordinary crime demanding extraordinary measures concerns
the use of special military tribunals. Although the military tribunal
scheme has been dealt severe setbacks by the Supreme Court,31 it is
useful to re-examine the original executive order issued by
President Bush in November 2001, to recognize what was
envisioned as a proper forum to try terrorist suspects. The order
exhibits a willingness to establish the type of state security court
prevalent in the Middle East in that it would allow for conviction
upon only a vote of two-thirds of the presiding judges and
imposition of sentence (including death) upon a similar two-thirds
vote.32 Further, it envisions the admission of secret evidence,
evidence obtained by coercive means, no confrontation rights, and
no right of appeal. The military order, the provisions of which were
never actually enacted, reflects what sort of process the government
believes the Islamist terrorist is entitled to. Lest we think that this
28. 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008). Abu Ali's allegations of torture were far more
extensive and only those undisputed facts are noted in this paper.
29. For a detailed description and analysis of the Abu Ali case, see Wadie E.
Said, Coercing Voluntariness, 85 IND. L.J. - (forthcoming 2009).
30. Id.
31. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006),
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
32. Military Order - Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism, November 13, 2001, available at http://fas.org/irp/
offdocs/eo/mo-111301.htm.
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position originated with the Bush administration, recall that in 1995
then-Vice President Al Gore endorsed the Palestinian Authority's
establishment of similar state security courts to try members of
Islamist groups opposed to the Middle East peace process.33 A
restrictive and restricted tribunal is all those deemed Middle Eastern
terrorists deserve, it seems.
III. Conclusion
While much has been written on how the above mentioned
phenomena reflect on the United States, in these brief remarks I
have tried to focus on the use by the United States of extraordinary
tactics against those real or perceived Middle Eastern terrorists and
what those tactics say about Middle Eastern legal systems.
Essentially, while the United States is generally very critical of how
such legal systems operate and the level of rights they provide, it
has demonstrated a willingness to tolerate tactics that would be
illegal in the United States, for the purpose of fighting terrorism.
This perceived double standard undermines the United States in
any attempts to strengthen the legal systems of the Middle East. It
also has the effect of weakening respect for international attempts to
apply principles of human rights law to try government officials for
violations. Stated another way, this position has allowed
individuals such as the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, to defy
an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court in
connection with the war on civilian populations in Darfur. In so
doing, al-Bashir has enjoyed popular support in Sudan and the
region for standing up to what is perceived as a Western system of
justice that punishes only those seen as hostile to its interests, yet
turns a blind eye to similar practices by allied or "moderate"
autocrats. It has also set the stage for non-state movements, such as
Hezbollah, to refuse on principle to cooperate with the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, which was established by the United Nations
to try those individuals responsible for the 2005 assassination of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. The tribunal is
viewed as biased in favor of one of two opposing political factions
33. Human Rights Watch, "Clinton Should Press Arafat to Abolish State
Security Courts," March 21, 1999, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/
news/1999/03/21clinton-should-press-arafat-abolish-state-security-courts (Human
Rights Watch Middle East Director referring to the courts as "a mockery of
justice").
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in the country, a factor leading to severe criticism, to the point
where Lebanese opposition leaders have stated that they will never
allow a trial to take place.
Ultimately, however, it should be clear that the United States is
willing to indulge deviations from the norm in the human rights
context when Middle East legal systems are successfully able to
characterize their extraordinary tactics as justified to fight terrorism.
While there are perhaps strategic benefits that accrue to the United
States in taking this position, ultimately the question needs to be
asked if the price is worth losing the ability and credibility required
to help establish the rule of law in the Middle East, a worthy goal in
its own right.
